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ABSTRACT
Overenforcement of the law is widespread but underinvestigated. Overenforce-
ment occurs when the total sanction, both legal and extralegal, suffered by the
violator of a legal rule exceeds the amount optimal for deterrence. Overenforce-
ment sometimes generates overdeterrence that cannot be remedied through the
adjustment of substantive liability standards or penalties in light of operational
and expressive constraints. When that happens, the legal system can counteract
the effects of overenforcement by adjusting evidentiary or procedural rules to
make liability less likely. This framework, which we call the overenforcement
paradigm, illuminates previously unnoticed features of various evidentiary and
procedural arrangements. It also provides a useful analytical and prescriptive
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INTRODUCTION
Overenforcement of the law is widespread but underinvestigated. Overenforce-
ment occurs when the violator of a legal rule suffers excessive harm-or more
harm than is necessary for optimal deterrence-from the actual implementation
of that rule. Some instances of overenforcement involve situations in which the
legal system acts imprudently by inflicting this harm: it can avoid the overenforce-
ment, but it fails to do so. The most obvious example of this occurs when the
legal system erroneously sets the penalty for the violation of a rule at a level
higher than is necessary, such as imposing a $5,000 fine on all drivers who
exceed a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour.
Other instances of overenforcement, however, involve situations in which the
legal system is entirely prudent in inflicting the harm in question: it simply
cannot avoid the overenforcement. For example, a rule that deems driving in
excess of fifty-five miles per hour dangerous and punishable, certainly harms
some safe drivers for whom deterrence is not necessary. But the legal system
cannot avoid this problem. The definitions of many legal rules need to be
overbroad in order to secure their efficient implementation. Such rules inflict
harm upon individuals who do not fall within the rules' substantive rationales.
Unavoidable overenforcement can also accompany even precisely drawn rules
and carefully balanced legal penalties. Imposing a formal legal penalty on a
firm, for instance, might trigger a dramatic decline in its stock value and severe
financial difficulties, effectively resulting in a substantial additional sanction.
Definitional spillovers thus are not the only cause of overenforcement. Overen-
forcement can also result from the extralegal consequences of legal liability, or
market spillovers.1
This Article examines overenforcement that is unavoidable and, conse-
quently, justifiable. Justifiable overenforcement is still socially harmful to the
extent that it creates excessive deterrence. Our goal is to identify this problem
and to offer a framework for addressing it. Until now, the concept of overenforce-
ment has gone largely unnoticed and unanalyzed in the academic literature. That
literature generally has conflated overenforcement, as we use that term, with
overdeterrence.2 Overenforcement and overdeterrence are closely related, but
1. See infra Section I.A.
2. The literature frequently describes as "overenforcement" indiscriminate or otherwise extreme
enforcement actions by government agencies that inflict social costs without producing offsetting
benefits. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust Laws:
Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 304-06 (2004) (equating
overenforcement with excessive enforcement actions by the government); Matthew P. Harrington,
Health Care Crimes: Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 111 (1994) (same); Michael J. Pyle,
Policy Comment, A "Flip" Look at Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End
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not identical. We use the term "overenforcement" as a term of art to describe a
certain kind of factual setup that unfolds after the application of the relevant
liability rule. Whenever the facts are such that the person found liable suffers a
total sanction that exceeds the net harm that his violation produced, overenforce-
ment exists in our terminology. That is true whether the total sanction comes
from legal penalties, from extralegal penalties, or from some combination of
both. Overenforcement is concerned only with the total sanction actually suf-
fered. Overdeterrence, by contrast, is concerned with the incentives that the
total sanction creates. One might thus say that overenforcement is situated in the
domain of ex post and overdeterrence in the domain of ex ante.3
This separation implies that overenforcement does not automatically translate
into overdeterrence. Overdeterrence depends on the probability that an indi-
vidual attaches to a future scenario in which he suffers harm from overenforce-
ment. Overenforcement accordingly translates into overdeterrence only to the
extent that individuals take it into account ex ante. When that happens, overen-
forcement causes social loss. A perspicacious legal system will recognize this
fact and reduce the number of overenforcement cases in order to bring the ex
ante probability of overenforcement (and, hence, overdeterrence) down. In the
simplest case-the case in which the overenforcement stems from a legal
penalty that is set inappropriately high-the legal system can do this merely by
adjusting the penalty downward to the appropriate level. In a case in which the
legal penalty is properly calibrated, the system might still ensure an optimal
total sanction by deducting the extralegal penalty from the legal one.5
Abusive Refinancing Practices?, 112 YALE L.J. 1919, 1925 (2003) (same); see also Earl M. Maltz,
Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement,
and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. Rv. 767, 782-86 (1991) (arguing that under an
originalist approach to statutory interpretation, judicial extension of a statute beyond its original
meaning qualifies as overenforcement). What these commentators call "overenforcement" is simply
imprudent, unauthorized, or wasteful enforcement. It does not involve individuals who suffer exces-
sively from the proper level of governmental enforcement of the relevant legal rule.
3. Overenforcement, in our lexicon, is unconcerned with the frequency of governmental enforce-
ment actions (although these can impact deterrence). It is also unconcerned with the distribution of
penalties among liable defendants.
4. In discussing overdeterrence, we treat deterrence in the traditional narrow sense, strictly as
cost-benefit analysis by rational, self-interested individuals: potential offenders compare the expected
penalty with the expected benefit and refrain from wrongdoing when the former outweighs the latter.
See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 & n.1
(Clarendon Press 1907) (1823) (laying out the traditional theory of deterrence); Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169, 180 (1968) (developing classic
economic model of deterrence). We do not here consider how overenforcement affects deterrence in its
broader, "new path" sense. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REv. 349 (1997) (articulating a social meaning theory of deterrence that focuses on the
criminal law's power to influence values and the formation of preferences).
5. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages?, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001) (arguing for a setoff system under which courts deduct nonlegal sanctions
from legal penalties); Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF
LAW & ECONOMICS (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell eds.) (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 27,
available at http://papers.ssrn.consol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=580843) (suggesting same).
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But not all cases are susceptible to such tidy solutions. Operational and
expressive constraints on the legal system sometimes prevent tinkering with
substantive rules or sanctions to remedy spillovers. Quick fixes to eliminate
overenforcement thus will not always work. Does this mean that overdeterrence
is inevitable in such cases? No. The legal system can still ameliorate it by
adjusting the requirements for a finding of liability-say, by heightening eviden-
tiary standards-in cases likely to involve systemic overenforcement. These
measures will not eliminate the overenforcement-a person found liable still
will suffer penalties exceeding the net harm his violation produced-but they
will reduce its probability. The consequent reduction in the probability of
overenforcement would reduce the expected harm for individuals. This would
mitigate overdeterrence, or even eliminate it altogether.
To the extent overenforcement is necessary, then, the legal system can
accommodate it without creating excessive deterrence on the ground. This is the
principal insight of this Article. While a wide body of literature has examined
the ways in which the legal system can counteract underenforcement of the law
by manipulating penalties and their probabilities,6 this literature has largely
ignored the role that procedural and evidentiary measures play in counteracting
overenforcement. As we explain in this Article, where systemic and unavoidable
overenforcement is present, these measures can combine with substantive liabil-
ity rules to create a second-best system of law enforcement.7 Given operational
and expressive considerations, the legal system must tolerate some overenforce-
ment. But it need not put up with the full amount of overdeterrence that
overenforcement threatens to engender. The system thus does well when it
minimizes overdeterrence through evidentiary and procedural mechanisms that
reduce the probability of overenforcement for potential transgressors. Jeremy
Bentham remarkably neglected this point in his overarching critique of evidence
law,8 and contemporary legal scholarship also tends to neglect it.
6. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Ill HARV.
L. REV. 869, 897 (1998) (arguing that courts should take the probability of escaping liability into
account when calculating punitive damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Dam-
ages, in 3 THE NEW PALGOAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 193-94 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages]; Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in
Market Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 466 (1996); infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57) (laying out the general economic theory of second best); Richard S.
Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CH.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3
(1998) (noting that "Second-Best Theory has startling implications for law-and-economics analysis");
John J. Donohue III, Some Thoughts on Law and Economics and the Theory of Second Best, 73
CHI.-KENrT L. Rav. 257 (1998) (discussing applications of the second-best theory in law); Thomas S.
Ulen, Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theory of Second Best in Law and Economics, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189 (1998) (same).
8. In his famous critique of the privilege against self-incrimination, Bentham denounced the
rationalization of evidence rules as mitigating the effects of harsh laws:
[B]y the effect of this impunity-giving rule, undue suffering has probably in some instances
been prevented. Prevented? but to what extent? To the extent of that part of the field of penal
1746 [Vol. 93:1743
OVERENFORCEMENT
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I develops the
general overenforcement framework. It clarifies the idea of overenforcement
and demonstrates that some instances of overenforcement are unavoidable in
light of operational and (particularly in the area of criminal law) expressive
constraints on the legal system. Part I then goes on to illustrate ways in which
evidentiary and procedural mechanisms might be used to mitigate this problem-
what we call the overenforcement paradigm.
Part II substantiates this theoretical framework. It points to legal rules
through which positive law minimizes overdeterrence by reducing the probabil-
ity of enforcement in cases in which the prospect of overenforcement is real.
Examples of such rules include the "clear and convincing" proof requirement
that applies in civil fraud actions, 9 the heightened procedural standards that
apply in securities class actions involving allegations of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion,' ° and the special corroboration requirement that common law attaches to
its overbroad prohibition against perjury."
Part III applies our paradigm to the area of corporate criminal liability. In its
current form, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability creates unique prob-
lems of overenforcement. Part III shows how evidentiary and procedural protec-
tions for corporations could ameliorate those problems by working to counteract
the definitional and market spillovers that current doctrine generates.
Part IV considers objections.
I. THE MODEL
Overenforcement of the law is sometimes avoidable and sometimes not.
Avoidable overenforcement is theoretically uninteresting. When a legal system
can avoid overenforcement without compromising its objectives, it should
simply do so. If the right sanction for violating a rule is $1,000, but the rule says
that violators should pay $2,000, the legal system should reduce the sanction by
$1,000. If a legal prohibition is broad when it should be narrow, the legal
system should narrow the prohibition.
But what about overenforcement that, for good reasons, is not open to such
straightforward corrections? As this Part makes clear, this type of overenforce-
law which is occupied by bad laws .... Applying with equal force and efficiency to all penal
laws without distinction-to the worst as well as to the best, it at the same time diminishes the
efficiency of such as are good.
7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (Bowring ed., 1843). Bentham overlooked the scenarios that we
identify here in which harsh laws are an operational necessity for the legal system. This explains his
failure to consider the way in which evidentiary mechanisms could minimize overdeterrence by
reducing an individual's probability of suffering from such laws.
9. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 443 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
10. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (1998).
11. See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945) (upholding the common law corroboration
requirement for cases in which a single prosecution witness accuses the defendant of perjury); Perjury
Act, 1911, c.6, § 13 (Eng.); sources cited infra note 106.
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ment is unavoidable and justifiable. Instances of unavoidable overenforcement
split roughly into two scenarios. In the first, adjudicators properly impose
liability and the appropriate legal sanction on a defendant. By doing so, they
also help to worsen the defendant's position in the market for goods, services, or
reputation. Consequently, in addition to bearing the harm of the legal sanction,
the defendant sustains further financial or other loss. 12 We call this scenario a
"market spillover." In the second scenario, adjudicators find the defendant liable
under an overbroad liability rule that they correctly apply. By overbroad, we
mean a liability rule that captures some cases that are not justified by its
underlying social purpose, such as a strict fifty-five mile per hour speed limit
that targets dangerous driving. The defendant's particular case falls within the
rule's formal prohibition but outside the scope of the rule's purpose. We call this
scenario a "definitional spillover."
Under both scenarios, the total harm the defendant suffers from the imposi-
tion of liability is excessive relative to the social cost of his conduct. This
consequence may not necessarily be unjust, and in isolated cases it will not
matter. But where the prospect of suffering it is realistic and recurring, overdeter-
rence results. Consider a situation in which the optimal sanction for deterring a
certain type of conduct (representing the total harm that society wants to avoid)
equals x, the average spillover addition to the sanction for such conduct equals
y, and a rational individual is contemplating a course of action that falls within
the sphere of conduct at issue. This individual will take the contemplated action
if its expected benefit to him or her (b) is greater than x + y. From a classic
social utility standpoint, the individual should take the action whenever b > x.
In any such case, the aggregate social welfare would be greater than it was
before. 13 The individual, however, will not take the action when x < b < x + y,
12. The Ford Explorer's rollover problems with Bridgestone tires, for example, caused Ford
significant reputational damage. Explorer sales collapsed by 21% in the first half of 2001 (even though,
in 2001, it was not clear that Ford was at fault). See Joann Muller, Ford: Why It's Worse Than You
Think, Bus. WK., June 25, 2001, at 80-89. On February 12, 2002, after reviewing extensive accident
data, the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration declined to launch an official investiga-
tion into the Explorer's safety, although legal claims are still pending against the company. See Monica
Roman, ed., Exonerating the Explorer, Bus. WK., Feb. 25, 2002, at 50. For further examples, see Faye
Rice, Denny's Changes Its Spots, FORTUNE, May 13, 1996, at 133, 142 (highlighting a 30% decline in
1993 operating income and a 4% drop in customer traffic for Denny's after the restaurant chain was
accused of racial discrimination after a widely-reported incident involving a Maryland Denny's that
denied service to a group of black Secret Service agents); Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:
The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REv.
1249, 1268-97 (2003) (describing financial fallout for Texaco, Home Depot, and Denny's from
class-action discrimination suits); infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text (citing additional
examples).
As some of these examples illustrate, there is by no means a perfect causal or temporal relationship
between imposition of the legal sanction and the market spillover harms that a defendant suffers. For
our theory to hold, there doesn't need to be. The combined harms, triggered by the same events, still
result in overenforcement on the ground.
13. See, e.g., RicHAwRD A. POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-16 (6th ed. 2003) (expounding this
basic approach to sanction-setting).
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which implies that y-the spillover addition to the optimal sanction-is gener-
ally detrimental to society.'
4
Does this mean that, in any overenforcement scenario, adjudicators should
deduct the spillover amount from the sanction that they would otherwise impose
on the defendant? Not necessarily. Each scenario can implicate independent
constraints on the ability of lawmakers to adjust sanctions downward in order to
offset any overdeterrence that might flow from overenforcement. To show why,
we will take each scenario in turn. Section A looks at market spillovers. Section
B addresses definitional spillovers. Section C explains how, under our overen-
forcement paradigm, the law can ameliorate the effects of these spillovers
through evidentiary and procedural mechanisms that reduce overdeterrence
without running afoul of the limitations discussed in Sections A and B.
A. MARKET SPILLOVERS
Take the market spillover scenario first. Although a market spillover can be
triggered in part by a court's decision, it is still extralegal. Deducting it from the
legal sanction would therefore be deeply problematic, for a number of reasons.
The first reason turns on the relationship between law and social meaning.
Academics, particularly in the area of criminal law, have recently begun to
explore how background social norms and conventions against which legal
sanctioning regimes operate limit the ability of adjudicators to manipulate
sanctions within those regimes. Criminal punishment "is not just a way to make
offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies moral condemna-
tion" 15 and repudiates the false valuations embodied in criminal wrongdoing.
This accepted social meaning of punishment imposes expressive limitations on
14. Importantly, we do not mean this analysis to suggest that there is some optimal level of crime-a
perspective that would treat a potential burglar's decision to refrain from burglarizing a house as
decreasing social welfare. Under our approach, the spillover addition to the optimal sanction is
detrimental to society only when it chills socially beneficial conduct. This chilling effect will be of
particular concern in the context of many business and regulatory crimes, where the distinction between
lawful and unlawful activity is often both difficult to discern and a matter of degree, and the lawful
conduct surrounding the crime often has great social value. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in
White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmics & PUB. POC 501, 506-07, 513 (2004)
(discussing the difficulty of distinguishing criminal from noncriminal behavior and the often high social
value of the legitimate conduct surrounding white collar crimes). By contrast, murder, rape, and other
core criminal offenses produce little or no social utility and great social harm. Overdeterrence will
rarely exist for such crimes, the ideal rate of which is zero. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful"
Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991) ("[O]nce it is recognized that society generally intends to prohibit
behavior through the criminal law, it follows that there cannot be an 'optimal' rate of crime ......
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The optimal amount of fraud is zero .....
Where it could exist, criminal law has crafted special doctrines to deal with it. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.02 (1962) (articulating "choice of evils" defense).
15. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996); see
also R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNFICATION, AND COMMUNITY 72 (2001) (arguing that "to understand
crimes as 'public' wrongs is to understand them as wrongs to which the community should respond,"
because "to mean what we say in condemning some conduct as wrong is to be committed to censuring
those who engage in it"); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in READINGS IN THE
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authorities' ability to adjust criminal sanctions in the single-minded pursuit of
efficiency. 16 In some circumstances, these constraints rule out the use of alterna-
tive sanctions even in cases in which such sanctions might otherwise inflict an
optimal amount of disutility on an offender.1 7 Merely fining a wealthy offender
as a penalty for his crime, for instance, sends the wrong message that the rich
are free to commit offenses so long as they are willing to pay for the privilege
of doing it.' 8 Likewise, sentencing a convict to community service instead of
prison "devalues community service, denigrates the virtue of those who perform
it, and shows contempt for the interests of those whom it is supposed to
benefit."1 9 Such penalties fail as publicly acceptable sanctioning methods be-
cause they are expressively irrational. They do not convey what conviction and
punishment are supposed to convey but instead undercut and contradict the
condemnatory message of the criminal law.
20
Mere announcement of criminal liability without any accompanying punish-
ment, be it a fine or otherwise, also undercuts that message.2 1 The way for
society to convey to offenders, victims, and the community that it takes a crime
seriously is to back up its words with some real-world penalty. 22 In criminal and
quasi-criminal cases involving market spillovers, then, it might not be possible
to adjust a sanction downward to compensate for the overenforcement that the
market spillover creates. Indeed, doing so not only would dilute the expressive
force of the criminal sanction in the particular case, but it also would work to
undermine the criminal law's more general moralizing, educative, and norm-
building function in the long term.23
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 467, 470 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1999) ("Punishment, in short, has a symbolic
significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.").
16. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 15, at 28 (observing that when persons engage in conduct that society
has labeled criminal, "[t]o remain silent in the face of their crimes would be to undermine ... [the]
declaration that such conduct is wrong"); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 131 (1988) (arguing that "we would be accomplices in the
crime if we failed to punish its perpetrator, because we would be condoning the evidence it gave us of
the relative worth of victim and offender").
17. See Kahan, supra note 15, at 619 (noting that, theoretically, fines can inflict the optimal amount
of disutility on offenders at a cheaper cost than other alternatives).
18. See id. at 621-23.
19. Id. at 627.
20. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONoMics 32-38 (1993) (discussing the "expres-
sive rationality" of punishment).
21. See Hampton, supra note 16, at 131 (maintaining that a failure to punish amounts to "acquiesc-
ing in the message.., sent about the victim's inferiority"); Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 123 (2004) ("Offenders,
victims, and society interpret the failure to punish to mean that the crime is not really wrong and that
the offender is free to keep doing it.").
22. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 21, at 122-23; Kahan, supra note 15, at 600-01.
23. See Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, Expressive Law and File Sharing Norms 35-39 (Northwest-
ern U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 05-18 & Bar-Ilan U., Faculty of
Law, Interdisc. Program for Law, Rationality, Ethics & Soc. Just., Working Paper No. 12-05, 2005)
(finding in an empirical study that laws accompanied by formal sanctions influence perceptions of
sharing digital files of copyrighted materials, while laws unaccompanied by sanctions do not), available
1750 [Vol. 93:1743
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Consider the following illustration. Suppose that prosecutors obtain a convic-
tion of a corporation for criminal fraud, an offense punishable under the
controlling statute by a $1,000,000 fine (which we will assume to be optimal for
deterrence). As is often the case in such situations, suppose further that, prior to
sentencing, the corporation suffers a substantial additional decline in its total
stock value as a result of the events surrounding the criminal investigation and
ultimate conviction-say, $950,000.24 This decrease could be based on any
number of factors, from the stock market's general loss of confidence in the
corporation's financial stability and future performance to the effect of the fraud
and the conviction on relationships with government agencies or with custom-
ers, suppliers, or other private parties.25 Should the adjudicators allow this
extralegal sanction to offset the statutory fine by setting the corporation's
ultimate penalty at $50,000?26 Probably not. This setoff would trivialize the
normative message that the criminal prohibition against fraud aims to project
and thereby undermine its expressive function. The message would shift from,
"Fraud is wrong, hurts innocent victims, and warrants a severe sanction," to,
"Findings of fraud can impact business, and that is punishment enough for those
who engage in it."
Of course, not all cases will implicate significant expressive constraints. The
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799364; Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1399, 1399,
1407-31 (2005) (discussing original experimental evidence showing that "the perceived legitimacy of
one law or legal outcome can influence one's willingness to comply with unrelated laws"); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What
Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1877 & n.7 (1992) (discussing the criminal law's
"socializing role"); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
477-88 (1997) (explaining that the criminal law's power to nurture and communicate societal norms is
intimately connected to its moral credibility). We note that, by the same token, applying the criminal
law too broadly to conduct that is more appropriately viewed as the subject of civil or administrative
regulation might give rise to similar long-term dilution concerns, an issue we do not address in this
Article. See, e.g., Coffee, supra, at 1877 (arguing that "overuse" of the criminal law in response to new
social problems "will impair the criminal law's nondeterrent functions ... because society's capacity to
focus censure and blame is among its scarcest resources"); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206 (1996) (describing the functions of civil
liability in circumstances where "moral blameworthiness" is insufficient to merit criminal sanctions).
24. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 757, 758 (1993) (presenting evidence that "the reputa-
tional cost of corporate fraud is large and constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms accused or
convicted of fraud"). In our example, the $950,000 decrease in the corporation's stock value adds to the
$1,000,000 decrease that would result from the impending fine. The total stock-value diminution
brought about by the corporation's conviction thus equals $1,950,000.
25. See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime:
Evidence, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 489, 493 (1999) (noting decreases in share value due to loss of goodwill
towards a company following an instance of product tampering); Karpoff & Lott, supra note 24, at 772
("The difference between a firm's wealth loss and the amount of loss attributable to legal penalties is an
estimate of the loss imposed by the market.").
26. If the corporation were to receive a $950,000 credit toward the fine and pay the government only
$50,000, the total stock-value diminution of $1,000,000 would be optimal for deterrence. This assumes,
as noted, that the legislative deterrence calculus has not already anticipated the $950,000 market
sanction in setting the statutory fine at the optimal level. For further discussion of that assumption, see
infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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less the public views an act as wrong, the less expressive fallout from a setoff
there will be.27 But even when a setoff is expressively allowable, it very likely
will be practically unworkable. The unsure relationship between extralegal
sanctions and legal penalties complicates any setoff system to the point of
infeasibility. Market spillovers occur when the invocation of the legal process
and the ultimate imposition of a legal penalty combine with extralegal sanctions
to bring the total harm to a defendant above the amount optimal for deterrence.
Setoffs in these cases would be problematic because courts could never be sure
that, if they lowered the penalty, the defendant would still suffer the full extralegal
loss. If, for example, a court decided to fine a corporation only $50,000, the
relative lightness of that fine might bolster the market's confidence and signifi-
cantly reduce the extralegal fallout or even eliminate it at some later point in
time.28 Any such development, over which the court has no control, would frustrate
the calculation that led it to the $50,000 figure and upset optimal deterrence.
Another reason for discarding a setoff system springs from the path-
dependence of trial and pre-trial procedures, which would frustrate setoffs even
more.29 The factfinding procedures that courts routinely apply center around
legal liabilities, entitlements, and formal sanctions. An elaborate system of
evidence rules has developed in light of this orientation. The existing frame-
work of procedure and evidence trims the information that courts receive in a
way that sharply separates the legal issues of a lawsuit or prosecution from its
extralegal consequences. 30 The principle of relevancy, which applies both dur-
27. See, e.g., McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 5, at 27-28 (explaining different relationship of
social norms to malum in se and malum prohibitum crimes); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear
the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1533, 1556-63 (1997) (discussing public perceptions of malum prohibitum and malum in se crimes
and noting criticisms of using criminal law to regulate "petty offenses" that the public does not perceive
as sufficiently wrongful or harmful). But see id. at 1565 (describing certain regulatory offenses that are
perceived by the public as being just as serious as traditional nonregulatory crimes).
28. Economists describe this effect as "crowding out." See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime
Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 485, 492-93
(2001) (noting that an increase in the frequency of crimes may induce changes in their social perception
by eroding the stigma that society attaches to them); AMIAI GLAZER & LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, WHY
GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDS AND WHY Ir FAILS 139-40 (2001) (discussing "crowding out" effect); see also
Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan 's Law 4 (University of
Texas School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 047, April 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=705162 (demonstrating that "policymakers cannot substitute legal sanctions
with nonlegal ones and still hold the level of nonlegal sanctions constant, since the level of each of
these is expected to affect the other").
29. See generally Stephen E. Margolis & Stan J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 17.
30. Some exceptions to this separation, of course, do exist. For instance, many courts allow
convicted defendants in white-collar criminal cases to point to the extralegal consequences that their
own prison time might have for employees and other stakeholders in arguing against incarceration at
sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Milikowsky, 65 F.3d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming downward
sentence departure granted to defendant because of the hardship his sentence would cause his
employees); United States v. Somerstein, 20 F. Supp. 2d 454, 460-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting
defendant a downward sentence departure for same reason); United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424
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ing pretrial discovery3' and with respect to evidence that courts ultimately
admit and consider at trial,32 is the most obvious example of this separation.
Rules against hearsay33 and opinion, 34 the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, 35 and the limitations on expert testimony,36 just to name a few, have
a similar trimming effect.
Adducing evidence of the extralegal consequences brought about by civil or
criminal liability is difficult to do under this framework. Such evidence nor-
mally will not lie within the first-hand knowledge of ordinary witnesses (except
in the most general way).37 Even if it did, to the extent that testimony ascribes a
dollar value to damage to a defendant's reputation or the like, it cannot be made
by an ordinary, as opposed to expert, witness.38 More often than not, however,
an expert witness testifying about these matters would face disqualification.
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 the general assessments
that an expert would make often would be too speculative to qualify as
admissible expert evidence.40 Economic experts narrowly estimating the impact
of a firm's civil or criminal liability on its stock price would usually pass the
admissibility threshold. If carried out properly, their event studies would furnish
evidence upon which courts could rely.4' But even these experts usually would
(3d Cir. 1994) (denying downward departure requested by defendant who asserted hardship to his
business resulting from conviction).
31. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26 (prescribing that only information relevant to the litigation is subject to
discovery).
32. See FED. R. EviD. 401 and 402; 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 773-74 (only evidence that has
potential legal consequences is relevant and admissible).
33. See FED. R. EvID. 801 and 802; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 93-96 (hearsay evidence is
inadmissible subject to exceptions).
34. See FED. R. EvID. 701; 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 9, at 41-47 (lay opinions are generally
inadmissible).
35. See 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 9, at 78 (describing the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
as a fundamental requirement that promotes accuracy in factfinding).
36. The Supreme Court articulated these limitations in its Daubert trilogy. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
37. Testimony about general reactions to a particular liability ruling would often rely on out-of-court
statements that the rule against hearsay renders inadmissible. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c) and 802; 2
McCoRMICK, supra note 9, at 98 (any out-of-court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted qualifies as hearsay).
38. The rule against opinion contains an explicit provision to this effect. See FED. R. EvID. 701; 1
McCoRMIcK, supra note 9, at 41-47.
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
40. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 1421, 1438 (1994) (uncovering the problems with such assessments and demonstrating that many
of them are biased in favor of plaintiffs because they sweep in elements of the market's reaction to bad
news that are not within the legal definition of damages); In re Executive Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979
F Supp. 1021, 1023-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (excluding an economic expert's testimony on Daubert
grounds for its failure adequately to distinguish between different repercussions on stock prices).
41. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91 (1999) (explaining the role of economic experts in litigation); see also In re Executive
Telecard, 979 F. Supp. at 1026 (indicating that event studies, if properly carried out, are both admissible
and reliable evidence).
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be unable to resolve the problem of indeterminate causation. In particular, they
would find it hard to differentiate between stock depreciation that reflects a
firm's business performance and the market's negative reaction to a liability
ruling as such. This differentiation is crucial to the setoff system. It is the impact
of the liability ruling per se-not the firm's poor business performance-that
courts can plausibly consider as a sanction-reducing factor.4 2
And those are the easy cases. In the hard ones, an expert may have no solid
basis at all for attempting to estimate the extralegal sanctions suffered by a
defendant. How, for example, might an expert witness quantify a criminal
defendant's sincere remorse and pangs of conscience, or his discreditation with
those around him, or his loss of future business and job opportunities? If
extralegal sanctions are to be considered in some sort of setoff calculus,
presumably these and similar sanctions should count as much as any other.43
Even in the most straightforward cases, principled implementation of a setoff
system would require substantial reform of existing trial practice. Specifically, it
would require a factfinding procedure analogous to the Brandeis brief mecha-
nism that courts presently employ in resolving broad constitutional and policy
issues.44 The tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of such a thorough-
going reform is uncertain at best. Basic path-dependence theory holds that a
shift from familiar to unfamiliar tasks and practices can generate costs that
make the game not worth the candle.45 A good example of this is the wide-
spread (and non-collusive) rejection of the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard.46
Good ergonomics always ought to consider the cost of modifying existing
habits, and the same holds true for the ergonomics of trial.
B. DEFINITIONAL SPILLOVERS
The second overenforcement scenario involves definitional spillovers. Unlike
42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 23, at 469-70 (discussing various extralegal sanctions that
often follow from criminal conviction).
44. See generally John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief-Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as
a Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1993) (highlighting the
importance of legislative facts in precedent-setting cases addressing constitutional or public policy
issues); see also Logiodice v. Tr. of Maine Cent. Inst., 296 F3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishing
between "Brandeis brief facts and courtroom proof"). The Brandeis brief has been frequently criticized
as anecdotal and unscientific. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and
Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993) (discussing
problems with and proposing alternatives to Brandeis-brief approach).
45. See Margolis & Liebowitz, supra note 29, at 18.
46. Studies proved the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard to be more ergonomic than the traditional
QWERTY keyboard. Dvorak was patented in 1936 but never caught on, despite marketing efforts,
because QWERTY locked in. Path-dependency appears to be the most plausible explanation for this.
See PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED
EXPECrATONS 221-44 (1994); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
332 (1985). For criticism of this thesis, see Stan Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Policy and Path
Dependence: From QWERTY to Windows 95, 18 REG. 35 (1995); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1990).
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market spillovers, definitional spillovers do not increase the overall sanction for
liable defendants. Rather, in cases of definitional spillovers, defendants divide
into two distinct categories. The first category consists of defendants who are
liable under the controlling legal rule both formally and as a matter of the rule's
substantive goal. Their liability, in other words, aligns not only with the
language of the overbroad liability rule, but also with its underlying rationale.
The second category consists of defendants whose liability is merely formal
because it aligns only with the language of the liability rule.47 Defendants
falling into the first category can make no valid complaints about overenforce-
ment and excessive deterrence. By imposing its sanction on these defendants,
the liability rule treats them exactly right. These defendants do not pay any of
the extra costs that the definitional spillover generates.
This is not the case with the second category of defendants. Defendants
belonging to that category internalize the costs of the definitional spillover in
their entirety. The overbroad liability rule treats these defendants exactly wrong.
We can see this by returning to our example involving the fifty-five mile-per-
hour speed limit. Suppose that the underlying rationale for the speed limit is to
prevent dangerous driving and that the rule is effected by a misdemeanor
criminal prohibition.48 Drivers who exceed the limit fall into two categories:
some drive their cars dangerously at that speed, and some do not. The rule's
prohibition, however, treats all drivers indiscriminately by holding each one
liable. In doing so, it generates social costs by excessively deterring safe
drivers. Many safe drivers will slow down-and each will slow down the
business to which he or she belongs-without producing any offsetting benefits
on the road.49
One might try to solve this problem by crafting a more flexible definition that
captures only the dangerous drivers while letting the safe ones go. But a number
of reasons exist to reject that solution. Strict rules that lay down unambiguous
47. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 32 (1991) (observing that the generaliza-
tions of most rules "encompass states of affairs that might in particular instances not produce the
consequence representing the rule's justification").
48. Classification of traffic violations varies by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions treat garden-variety
speeding as a criminal offense, with no right to a jury trial, while other jurisdictions treat it as a civil
offense. For example, in Alaska, a speeding violation is called an infraction and is not considered a
criminal offense, see ALASKA STAT. § 28.40.050(c)-(d) (2003), whereas Texas treats speeding violations
as criminal misdemeanors, see TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 542.301 & 750.002(b) (2004).
49. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) ("[S]peed limits are
justified by the State's interest in protecting human life and property. Perhaps most violations of such
rules actually cause no harm. No doubt many experienced drivers ... can operate much more safely,
even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen.").
The fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit does nothing to deter a third category of drivers: those who
drive dangerously even at a speed of fifty-five miles-per-hour or less. This yields a species of
underenforcement that is the opposite of overenforcement. Theoretically, a legal rule might be crafted
to strike the perfect balance between underenforcement and overenforcement. See SCHAUER, supra note
47, at 32-34 (discussing the over- and under-inclusiveness of rules). Rules of that sort do not fall under
the framework developed in this Article.
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precepts coordinate traffic much better than do flexible standards.5" They also
save a good deal of adjudication expenses and other enforcement costs. 5 ' And,
by providing a bright-line rule for police as well as motorists, they also help to
constrain potential abuses by law-enforcement personnel-such as racial profil-
ing-that might be easier to engage in under a vague, discretionary standard.52
In sum, operational constraints-the same constraints that led to choosing the
rule in the first place-prevent altering the definition to eliminate the overenforce-
ment that flows from the definitional spillover.
C. THE OVERENFORCEMENT PARADIGM
The overenforcement upon which we focus is systemic and justifiable, rather
than occasional and unjustifiable. For this reason, we separated it at the outset
from the avoidable overenforcement that extreme legal sanctions sometimes
produce. For the same reason, we also set aside the occasional overenforcement
that results from erroneous, wasteful, or otherwise flawed enforcement deci-
sions. For the purposes of what follows, this Article assumes that in both market
and definitional spillover scenarios courts and law-enforcing agencies do not
deviate in their decisions from the appropriate (and socially unavoidable) error
rate.53 More broadly, we assume that courts ascribe liability and impose legal
sanctions on proper grounds, and that agencies do not overstep their authority or
expend resources wastefully or imprudently.54 We also assume that individual
and organizational actors are basically rational and reasonably informed about
the workings of the law.55
Overenforcement that is systemic, unavoidable, and justifiable still creates
excessive deterrence on the ground. This chills many worthwhile activities.
Ideally then, the legal system should not simply put up with overenforcement.
Whenever appropriate, it should counterbalance overenforcement through correc-
tive measures that reduce excessive deterrence. These measures must reduce
excessive deterrence within the expressive and operational constraints we identi-
fied earlier and without seriously compromising the objectives that the substan-
tive law strives to attain. This latter condition is crucial. In light of it,
50. See SCHAUER, supra note 47, at 32-34, 125 (noting that strict rules, such as "Speed Limit 55,"
enhance certainty and promote coordination).
51. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 563-64
(1992) (noting that strict rules, such as well-specified traffic regulations, substantially reduce adjudica-
tion expenses and other enforcement costs whenever adjudication and enforcement are frequent).
52. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 61-62 (1999) (making this point in the course
of holding unconstitutional a city ordinance that gave police officers "absolute discretion" to determine
what activities constituted loitering within the meaning of the statute).
53. For courts, that rate is set by the controlling proof standards. See 2 McCoPmtCK, supra note 9, at
437-49. We assume that courts comply with these standards.
54. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 17-21, 542-45, 643-45 (discussing the plausibility of this
assumption).
55. This standard assumption does not presuppose omniscience, nor does it ascribe other superhu-
man capacities to individual actors. It only means that the actors upon which this Article focuses are
willing and able "to use instrumental reasoning to get on in life." Id. at 17.
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overenforcement can be counterbalanced only by procedural and evidentiary
mechanisms that reduce the overdeterrence. These mechanisms must not dilute
the substantive liability rule that produces the overenforcement. We call this
framework the overenforcement paradigm.
56
To better understand this paradigm, contrast overenforcement with underen-
forcement and the measures the legal system can use to counteract it. Take a
jurisdiction that suffers from serious drawbacks in law enforcement on account
of scarcity of resources. One way to achieve optimal deterrence would be
simply to spend more on law-enforcement. But that is not the only way. To be
sure, if the money is not there, the jurisdiction cannot eliminate underenforce-
ment per se. But it still does not have to put up with the consequent dilution of
deterrence that underenforcement causes. Rather than mobilizing additional
enforcement resources, the jurisdiction can boost sanctions in a way that cancels
out the underenforcement's diluting effect.
As is well-recognized in the literature, the simplest way to do this is to divide
the theoretically optimal sanction by the existing probability of enforcement.57
If the ideal penalty is $100,000, and the probability of enforcement is one-third,
the actual penalty should be set at $300,000. This would bring the expected
penalty for each prospective wrongdoer into line with the optimal penalty of
$100,000 (1/3 X $300,000). Absent this adjustment, the expected penalty would
equal only $33,333 (1/3 X $100,000) and prospective wrongdoers would be
significantly underdeterred. 58 The best way to deal with that problem may not
be to cut back on other valuable programs or to raise additional revenue to fund
more enforcement resources and initiatives. Instead, assuming good information
is available, the jurisdiction can increase the sanction, and can do so cheaply
and easily.59
56. In an influential article, Meir Dan-Cohen developed an analogous approach based on "decision
rules" (directed at officials to guide decisions) and "conduct rules" (directed at the public to guide
conduct). See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984). Using his approach, one might say that our framework
calls for special procedural and evidentiary decision rules that counteract overenforcement without
undermining the values embodied in the corresponding substantive conduct rules. But unlike Dan-
Cohen's model of acoustic separation, the decision rules in our framework are not walled off from the
general public. To the contrary, for those rules to reduce excessive deterrence, the public must know
both that the rules exist and how they apply. It need not know, however, of the policies underlying those
rules. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (distinguishing between rules that minimize the
appearance of overt trade-offs between competing goals and values and those that do not).
57. See Becker, supra note 4; Craswell, supra note 6; Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages, supra
note 6.
58. In these circumstances, any rational, self-interested offender would be willing to violate the law
if his benefit from doing it equaled $34,000. Taking the $100,000 sanction as corresponding to the net
harm that the average wrongdoing inflicts, it is apparent that the offender is not internalizing the full
social costs of his wrongdoing.
59. Just as expressive considerations can constrain lawmakers' ability to adjust a sanction down-
ward, they can also constrain lawmakers' ability to adjust a sanction upward. In fact, "when increasing
the penalty on a particular law is out of step with norms in a community, [doing so] may reduce
deterrence instead of promoting it." Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56
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Overenforcement accompanied by counterbalancing procedural devices is the
mathematical equivalent of underenforcement rectified by soaring legal sanc-
tions. If the sanction that overenforcement produces amounts to $300,000
instead of $100,000, and-for reasons already given60 -lawmakers cannot
bring this sanction down to $100,000, they can still eliminate the overdeterrence
by reducing the general probability of enforcement from one to one-third. The
expected sanction for potential wrongdoers would consequently equal $100,000
(1/3 x $300,000)-the right penalty for optimal deterrence. Lawmakers can do
this by setting up special procedural or evidentiary barriers to enforcement, such
as heightened standards of proof or other burdens placed upon prosecutors or
claimants.
This paradigm for attacking the problem of overenforcement instantiates the
general theory of second-best.6 1 Under that theory, observing an economic
distortion (such as a procedural requirement that impedes factfinding) is not by
itself a good reason for eliminating it. The observed distortion may be counterbal-
ancing another distortion (overenforcement) that the relevant social institution,
such as the law, needs to put up with due to other constraints (operational and
expressive). This possibility calls for a comprehensive evaluation of the prob-
lem of overenforcement and the framework we have articulated for addressing
it. At the same time, like second-best solutions generally, it does not call for
perfection. In our theory, the legal system does its second-best by mitigating
unavoidable overenforcement with heightened evidentiary or procedural require-
ments that minimize overdeterrence. But our theory offers no concrete prescrip-
tions for a perfectly tailored counterbalancing approach that would do exactly
right on a case-by-case basis. As a practical matter, this is unattainable. The
legal system must do its practical best without satisfying the perfectionist's test
for accuracy.
62
As an illustration of how our paradigm might work, consider the following
example. Say a jurisdiction contemplates legislation that will determine the
conditions under which people may drive cars following the consumption of
alcoholic beverages. Two legislative possibilities-a rule and a standard-are
on the table. The lawmakers can set a flexible standard providing that "any
person driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol that substantially
impairs his or her ability to control and operate the vehicle shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." Alternatively, they can lay down a rigid rule specifying the
permissible level of alcohol in the blood for car drivers (L) and stating that "any
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2004). Overly severe penalties "create what may be termed an inverse
sentencing effect" because, "[a]s penalties increase, people may not be as willing to enforce them
because of the disproportionate impact on those caught." Id. at 1185; see also id. at 1210 n.42 (citing
studies documenting this effect).
60. See supra sections l.A-B.
61. See sources cited supra note 7.
62. See WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 96-97 (1990) (rejecting the
demand for perfection in legal rules as unrealistic).
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driver with a blood-alcohol level above L shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
The costs and benefits of enforcement will differ under each regime. Police in
both regimes will be authorized to use breathalyzers for determining L. The
standard-based regime, however, also requires police and courts to examine
each driver's condition individually, at a relatively high cost.6 3 The rule-based
regime substantially reduces that cost, and it does so cheaply. The effects of
various blood-alcohol levels on the average driver's control over his or her car
are already scientifically established, and lawmakers can use them for free. By
making a straightforward statement that "any driver with a blood-alcohol level
above L shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," the rule-based regime capitalizes on
this economy of scale. 64 It thus dramatically minimizes the sum of promulga-
tion and enforcement expenses, which provides a prima facie reason for prefer-
ring it over the standard-based regime.65 The lawmakers, however, also need to
consider the impact of each regime on the efficacy of enforcement and the
corresponding level of deterrence. On that score, the standard-based regime
produces more accurate liability rulings than does the rule-based regime.
As with any rules-versus-standards question, then, the lawmakers must weigh
the tradeoff between accuracy on the one hand and future enforcement costs on
the other. Say the lawmakers find the standard-based regime too expensive and
opt for the rule-based regime. Now they need to decide upon an appropriate
figure for L, which turns out to be a difficult task. If L were to represent the
point at which the influence of alcohol impedes the average driver's control
over his or her car, the rule would fail to deter drivers who lose control after
drinking less alcohol than the average. Assuming the lawmakers are particularly
interested in deterring this vulnerable category of drivers, they will choose a
lower L threshold. This will generate overenforcement of the definitional spill-
over type. Under this regime, drivers with average and above-average resistance
to alcohol will often have to choose between consuming alcohol and driving
when, for them, both activities are socially innocuous or beneficial. The result is
excessive deterrence from chilling safe driving and social life at once.66 The
lawmakers might want to consider introducing corrective measures that would
mitigate this effect.
From the lawmakers' viewpoint, reduction of the penalty for driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI) is not an option. That measure would be
overcorrective because it would equally benefit all alcohol-consuming drivers,
both safe and unsafe. Safe drivers might be deterred adequately (or still
excessively, depending on how far the penalty reduction goes), but unsafe
drivers would be deterred insufficiently. Reducing the penalty also would chip
63. See Kaplow, supra note 51, at 572-73.
64. Id. at 563-64.
65. Id. at 568-77.
66. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 177-99 (2004)
(demonstrating how overbroad liability rules chill socially beneficial activities, such as driving, without
producing offsetting benefits).
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away at the educational impact of the DUI prohibition and would vitiate its
expressive significance.67
A better corrective measure is to reduce the probability of a DUI conviction
predominantly for safe drivers. The lawmakers might, for instance, require two
independent breathalyzer tests in order to convict a person of DUI. They might
also stipulate that each test must independently establish the person's blood-
alcohol level beyond all reasonable doubt.68 They might then qualify this
evidentiary safeguard by providing that it will not extend to a driver who
committed a separate traffic offense. This qualification would capture many safe
drivers within the safeguard while excluding many unsafe drivers from its
protection. Under this regime, drivers with average and above-average resis-
tance to alcohol would estimate their expected sanction by multiplying the
statutory penalty by their reduced probability of detection and conviction. The
resulting figure (admittedly not as neat as in our numerical example) would
bring deterrence closer to the optimal level. Ex post, some unsafe drivers would
still escape conviction and punishment, and some safe drivers would not. The
law, however, would do better at adequately deterring every prospective driver
ex ante.69
An identical example can be constructed for market-spillover cases. Assume
that in the market for professional car drivers, drivers with a DUI record make
fifty percent less than do clean-sheet drivers. This is so because the insurance
costs for drivers with DUI records are high, and those costs are high because,
under the chosen threshold for L, unsafe drivers who cross that threshold pool
with safe drivers who do the same. The prospect of a reduced salary on top of
legal sanction for all drivers (safe and unsafe) overdeters the average driver. In
these circumstances, the lawmakers should adopt the same corrective measures
as in the previous example. Evidence law employs such measures in the form of
corroboration requirements.7 °
Corroboration requirements, of course, are not the only corrective measures
available. Lawmakers may also resort to other procedural and evidentiary
mechanisms to counterbalance overenforcement. Examples of these mecha-
nisms are abundant and merit detailed analysis. We therefore close our theoreti-
67. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
68. For a general discussion of the scientific reliability issues raised by breathalyzers, see DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FoRFNsic SCIENCE IssuEs § 8-1.2.4, at 397-98 (2002).
69. One might object that the lawmakers could achieve the same result in a more straightforward
way by simply creating a new crime of "committing a separate traffic offense while driving under the
influence of alcohol." Unless the lawmakers also eliminate or significantly scale back the penalties for
the stand-alone DUI prohibition, however, doing so will not mitigate the spillover costs we have
identified. As we have already explained, reducing or eliminating those penalties very likely will not be
an option. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1984, c.27 § 89(2) (Eng.) ("A person prosecuted for
[speeding not involving an accident] shall not be liable to be convicted solely on the evidence of one
witness to the effect that, in the opinion of the witness, the person prosecuted was driving the vehicle at
a speed exceeding a specified limit.").
1760 [Vol. 93:1743
OVERENFORCEMENT
cal discussion and turn to positive law. Specifically, we turn to three real-world
examples of the overenforcement paradigm in action: the "clear and convinc-
ing" proof requirement for civil fraud actions; the heightened procedural stan-
dards applicable in securities class actions involving allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation; and the common law's special corroboration requirement for
perjury prosecutions.
II. POSITIVE LAW
Some claims and contentions adjudicated in civil cases require proof by
"clear and convincing evidence." This standard is more demanding than is
"preponderance of the evidence," the general proof standard that applies in civil
litigation. 71 The preponderance standard is both fair and efficient. By allowing
the party with the better proof to prevail, it treats the plaintiff and the defendant
as equals.72 That makes it fair. By allowing the party with the better proof to
prevail, it also minimizes the number of erroneous decisions. Any other proof
standard would produce more erroneous decisions than would the preponder-
ance standard. 73 That makes it efficient. Any other proof standard, such as
"clear and convincing evidence," therefore must be justified on special grounds.
The overenforcement paradigm provides those grounds in cases involving
allegations of fraud. Claims and contentions involving allegations of fraud
generally require proof by clear and convincing evidence.74 Under our theory, a
primary justification for this heightened proof requirement flows from the
consequences of liability for fraud. A finding that a person committed fraud
often exposes that person to two sanctions rather than one. The first sanction is
legal: the liable party pays damages and any other applicable court-ordered
penalties and fees. The second sanction is nonlegal and social, what we catego-
71. See 2 McCoRMICK, supra note 9, at 441-45.
72. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (noting that "the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants"); see also Alex
Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 279, 333-42 (1996) (demonstrat-
ing that the preponderance standard places equal risks of error on the plaintiff and the defendant).
73. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 487 (arguing that the
preponderance standard is optimal because it generates the lowest possible number of factfinding
errors); David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 605 n.19 (1980) (book review)
(same); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement
of Law, 38 J. EcoN. LrrERA-ruRE 45, 60-62 (2000) (stating that subject to special concerns, such as
protection of innocents from erroneous convictions, evidence law would promote efficiency by reduc-
ing both false positives and false negatives).
74. See 2 McCoRMIcK, supra note 9, at 443. But see Grogan, 498 U.S. at 288-90 (concluding that in
actions for fraud under federal statutes, Congress generally intended preponderance-of-the-evidence to
be the controlling proof standard). The preponderance standard would be appropriate in our framework
only when overenforcement is not present. Cf Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390
(1983) (observing that the need to protect defrauded investors in anti-fraud actions under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 suggests that courts should prefer the preponderance standard over that of clear
and convincing evidence, despite the "risk of opprobrium [to the defendant] that may result from a
finding of fraudulent conduct").
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rize as a market spillover. Following his identification by the legal system as
fraudulent, the liable party might also suffer a reputation loss in his community,
the loss of business and social opportunities, shame, guilt, emotional distress,
and other substantial nonlegal sanctions.75 These harms compound the reduc-
tion in his welfare from the legal penalty, resulting in overenforcement and,
quite likely, overdeterrence. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat have suggested that
courts should deduct such nonlegal sanctions from the legal penalty in order to
counteract this effect. 76 In cases involving fraud, however, expressive con-
straints on the manipulation of penalties frequently will prevent this.77 In those
cases, the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard avoids or substantially re-
duces the danger of overdeterrence by raising the applicable proof threshold and
thereby reducing potential defendants' probability of being adjudicated fraudu-
lent. This is a straightforward application of the overenforcement paradigm.
Our second example comes from securities class actions. Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), the complaint in any
class action involving allegations of material untrue statements or omissions
relating to securities must "specify each statement alleged to have been mislead-
ing, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief," must
"state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. '7 8 When the
action claims that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent or a similar state of
mind, commonly called scienter, 79 "the complaint shall, with respect to each act
or omission ... state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."8° Failure to meet any
of these pleading requirements warrants dismissal of the action.8' After discov-
ery, if the defendant can show that no evidence substantiates any of the required
allegations, the defendant will generally be able to succeed in obtaining sum-
75. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
76. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 5, at 405-10; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text
(explaining how this setoff approach accords with classic social utility theory).
77. See supra section I.A.
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B).
79. See In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 760 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("In a
securities fraud action, 'the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud."') (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976)).
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2). Absent this reform, general allegations of scienter would suffice. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (stating that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity," but that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally"); In re Sec. Litig. BMC Software, Inc., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 868 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (explaining that the PSLRA "requires a heightened standard of
pleading over that set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which allows a state of mind, or
scienter, to be averred generally"); Collmer v. U.S. Liquids, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723 n.5 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (same); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REV. 551, 600-07 (2002)
(offering a detailed account of the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements relative to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b)).
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
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mary judgment in its favor.82 Courts vigorously enforce these procedural require-
ments.83
As Stephen Choi explains in a recent paper, the upshot is that these PSLRA
requirements effectively shield corporate defendants from securities-fraud class
actions unaccompanied by hard evidence of fraud.8 4 Choi points out that the
PSLRA's procedural barriers have reduced both filing and prosecution of frivo-
lous and other unsubstantiated lawsuits. 85 But, according to Choi, they also
have discouraged many meritorious lawsuits that became unprofitable from the
plaintiffs' attorneys' perspectives.86 Normatively, Choi sees this tradeoff as one
of dubious merit.87 Viewing it through this Article's framework, we see the
issue as more complicated.
Securities class action suits generate a threatening overenforcement potential
along a number of dimensions. Chief among these is an action's effect on a
firm's stock value and the consequent harm to its business (a market spillover,
in our taxonomy). As Janet Cooper Alexander demonstrated in an important
empirical study, before the PSLRA's reforms, firms faced with threats of
securities class actions routinely experienced steep drops in the value of their
shares.88 This occurred both before and after courts ruled on certification
questions and without any showing of potential success on the merits by the
82. To escape summary judgment, the plaintiff must point to evidence raising a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Conclusory allegations, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated
assertions, and legalistic argumentation will not do. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093,
1097 (5th Cir. 1993).
83. See, e.g., Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that securities fraud claim is properly stated only if allegations collectively add up to a strong
inference of the required state of mind); Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 168-69 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that fraudulent intent can be established either by alleging facts to show that the
defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud or by alleging facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misconduct); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F.
Supp. 2d 749, 775 (E.D. Va. 2004) (dismissing action for failure to properly specify the defendant's
misconduct and state of mind in the pleadings).
84. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act?, 3-6 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 558285, 2004), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract= 558285.
85. Id. at 45-47.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 505-21 (1991). The primary focus of Alexander's study was securities
class actions involving accusations of fraud, which are particularly likely to trigger market spillovers.
See infra note 134 and accompanying text. While it undoubtedly has been very influential, the study is
not free from controversy. See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False
Foundation: The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
33 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 959 (1996) (arguing that Alexander's study is fundamentally flawed and
criticizing Congress for relying on it in legislating the PSLRA); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman,
Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities
Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2083-84 (1995) (criticizing Alexander's study for failing to account
for industry-wide price declines in the examined stocks).
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plaintiffs. 89 Skyrocketing monetary awards recoverable in securities class ac-
tions contribute to this effect. 90 More often than not, these awards are dispropor-
tionate to what the defendants earn and can pay. They typically exceed the
firm's working capital, posing a serious threat to its ability to remain in
business. 9 ' Corporate defendants thus face pressure to settle suits regardless of
their merits, 92 and the market reflects this fact.
To this threat one should add both the corporate and the individual defen-
dants' prospect of sustaining reputational losses, 93 as well as other factors that
create overenforcement on the ground, including the plaintiffs' entitlement to
implead as many defendants-both corporate and individual-as they deem fit
(a definitional spillover, in our taxonomy). Class attorneys take full advantage
of this entitlement even in cases in which the risk of not collecting the judgment
from the firm is practically nonexistent.9 4 This works to make individual
defendants-who are often both wealthy and reputable-anxious by triggering
their risk-aversion to even the slightest possibility of loss of livelihood and
social status.95 These defendants consequently press for settlement within their
camp, whatever of the merits.9 6 In short, securities class actions greatly skew
the settlement balance in both strong and weak cases, placing upon corporate
89. See Alexander, supra note 88, at 505-33.
90. See id. at 529-33.
91. See id. at 532, tbl. 5; see also In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F Supp. 735, 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting attorneys for the Warner Communications
company who stated at a settlement hearing in court, "If we lost [at trial] it could very well have meant
bankruptcy. That is what the damages could have been if left to a jury.").
92. To mitigate this problem for all class actions, rather than just those that fall under the PSLRA,
some judges and commentators recommend that courts certify only those class actions that they find
meritorious. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-304 (7th Cir. 1995) (implement-
ing the merits-inquiry approach to class action certification); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in
Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 51, 52-55 (2004) (criticizing the Supreme Court's
holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974), that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 does not
authorize courts to scrutinize the class action's merits prior to its certification and recommending a
refined merits-inquiry approach on the grounds of both fairness and economic efficiency); see, e.g.,
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1300 (acknowledging that corporate defendants in class actions
are pressured into settling cases regardless of their merits); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F3d 935,
937 (7th Cir. 2002) (same). The amounts at which defendants in Alexander's study settled enabled her
to discern the going settlement rate at the time: about one quarter of the potential monetary award.
Alexander, supra note 88, at 500.
93. See Alexander, supra note 88, at 532.
94. See id. at 529.
95. See id. at 530.
96. As Alexander explains:
In many cases, the individual defendants are still officers and directors of the issuer, and thus
are in a position to make litigation decisions for the major entity defendant. These individuals
may well apply their individual risk preferences, even if unconsciously, in making decisions
for the entity about whether to settle the case or risk a trial. Thus suing the company's
directors and officers individually may alter the company's risk preferences, and thereby




defendants "inordinate or hydraulic pressure ... to settle' 97 and triggering a
clear need to protect defendants from what is commonly characterized as
blackmail under color of law.
98
The principal social benefit of the PSLRA's procedural reforms is the extent
to which they counteract this effect and the overdeterrence that flows from it.
Their more narrow, secondary benefit is the elimination of frivolous lawsuits.
To be sure, the PSLRA also drives from the courts many meritorious lawsuits
by making them unprofitable. This is undoubtedly undesirable. Our point is not
to weigh in on one or the other side of this balance. Ours is the supplemental
claim that, in light of our framework, it is apparent that the tradeoff introduced
by the PSLRA's procedural reforms is more complex than Choi and others have
appreciated. Rather than simply removing many frivolous but also some merito-
rious class actions, those reforms also counteract market and definitional spill-
overs that both frivolous and meritorious actions generate. The social loss from
the frustration of meritorious suits must be measured against the sum of the
PSLRA's benefits, and the resulting tradeoff is unclear.99
Our final example in this Part is the special requirement of corroborative
evidence that the common law attaches to its overbroad prohibition against
perjury.' 00 This requirement bars conviction for perjury solely on the testimony
of a single witness. Any such testimony must be corroborated by additional
testimony or other evidence.1 ' In the absence of corroboration, the jury must
acquit the defendant. 0 2 The judge's failure to instruct the jury to this effect
constitutes plain and reversible error.10 3 This corroboration requirement is
97. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001).
98. See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the
scholarly opinion that "settlements in securities cases reflect high risk of catastrophic loss, which
together with imperfect alignment of managers' and investors' interests leads defendants to pay
substantial sums even when the plaintiffs have weak positions"); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging, in the class action context, that "the industry is likely
to settle-whether or not it really is liable"). For a different view, see Charles Silver, "We're Scared to
Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2003) (arguing that the
"blackmail charge" leveled against class actions is empirically unsupportable).
99. Although the exact dollar value of the total spillovers to which we refer is unknown, its
conservative estimation points to a multimillion dollar figure. See Alexander, supra note 88, at 515-20.
100. See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945); Perjury Act, 1911, c.6, § 13 (Eng.).
101. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 608.
102. See id.; United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373, 1378 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that "although
criticized by some, the two-witness rule remains viable in perjury prosecutions, at least in those perjury
prosecutions brought under a statute in which the rule has not been expressly abrogated").
103. The Court in Weiler explained that allowing a judge to refuse to issue such an instruction
would enable a jury to convict on the evidence of a single witness, even though it believed,
contrary to the belief of the trial judge, that the corroborative testimony was wholly untrustwor-
thy. Such a result would defeat the very purpose of the rule, which is to bar a jury from
convicting for perjury on the uncorroborated oath of a single witness. It is the duty of the trial
judge, when properly requested, to instruct the jury on this aspect of its function, in order that
it may reach a verdict in the exercise of an informed judgment.
323 U.S. at 610-11; see also id. at 611 (going on to hold that "[t]he refusal of the trial judge to instruct
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unusual because it is an exception to the general law regarding the weight of
testimonial evidence. Under the general rule, "[t]he touchstone is always credibil-
ity; the ultimate measure of testimonial worth is quality and not quantity. Triers
of fact in our factfinding tribunals are, with rare exceptions, free in the exercise
of their honest judgment, to prefer the testimony of a single witness to that of
many."1
04
Despite this general rule, the corroboration requirement for perjury prosecu-
tions "is deeply rooted in past centuries."'' 0 5 The unmodified common law
requirement of corroboration for perjury prosecutions still applies in many
United States jurisdictions. 10 6 The law in these jurisdictions tracks English
law. 10 7 In England, Section 13 of the Perjury Act of 1911, which codified the
common law,'0 8 states:
A person shall not be liable to be convicted of any offence against this Act, or
of any offence declared by any other Act to be perjury or subornation of
perjury, or to be punishable as perjury or subornation of perjury solely upon
the evidence of one witness as to the falsity of any statement alleged to be
false.' 0 9
Courts interpret this provision as a stringent corroboration requirement," 0 while
the jury as requested was error"); Chaplin, 25 E3d at 1376 n.2 (holding that, because the corroboration
requirement controls evidentiary sufficiency, the trial judge should give the jury the appropriate
instruction even when the defendant does not request it, and that a failure to do so is plain error).
104. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 608.
105. See id. at 608-09.
106. See, for example, Weiler, 323 U.S. 606; Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373; Hammett v. State, 797 So. 2d
258 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Ellsworth, 15 P.3d 1111 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Watson v. State,
509 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Murphy v. United States, 670 A.2d 1361 (D.C. 1996); and State v.
Barker, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993), each of which requires corroboration for a single
witness whose testimony accuses the defendant of perjury. See also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.060
(Banks-Baldwin 2004) ("In any prosecution for perjury or false swearing .. . falsity of a statement may
not be established solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single witness."); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 118(b) (West 1999) ("No person shall be convicted of perjury where proof of falsity rests solely
upon contradiction by testimony of a single person other than the defendant .... "); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
210.50 (McKinney 1999) ("In any prosecution for perjury ... or in any prosecution for making an
apparently sworn false statement, or making a punishable false written statement, falsity of a statement
may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.").
107. See, e.g., Weiler, 323 U.S. at 610 n.4; Marvel v. State, 131 A. 317, 318 (Del. 1925). In 1970,
Congress modified this rule significantly for federal cases in Title IV of the Organized Crime Control
Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (2000). That provision explicitly provides that the corroboration
requirement does not apply in federal prosecutions for false declarations before a grand jury or a court.
See id.
108. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 610 n.4.
109. Perjury Act, 1911, c.6, § 13 (Eng.).
110. See, e.g., R. v. Hamid, 69 Cr. App. R. 324 (1979); see also Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S.
620, 626 (1926) ("The general rule in prosecutions for perjury is that the uncorroborated oath of one
witness is not enough to establish the falsity of the testimony of the accused set forth in the indictment
as perjury. The application of that rule in federal and state courts is well nigh universal."); Roche v.
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legal scholars criticize it as having outlived any of its plausible justifications."'
Finding a rationale for this requirement in a system that generally allows
judges and juries to convict a defendant on the testimony of a single witness is
not easy. After all, if one witness's testimony that the jury finds credible beyond
all reasonable doubt is good enough to convict a defendant in a murder trial,
why should it not be enough in a trial for perjury? One commonly offered
answer is that the corroboration requirement for perjury prosecutions is not
really an exception to the general rule regarding testimonial worth in that it does
not turn on any judgment regarding the trustworthiness of the evidence. Rather,
as the Supreme Court recognized in Weiler v. United States, the requirement is a
necessary evidentiary barrier with a very different aim: to avoid chilling wit-
nesses with the prospect of easy prosecution for perjury. 112
This rationale, which courts and commentators have done little to unpack,
derives from the overenforcement paradigm. The common law definition of
perjury is any false statement regarding a material matter that a witness makes
knowingly and under oath in a judicial proceeding.' '3 On its face, this definition
contains three mutually related ambiguities. First, what counts as a "statement"?
Would it include, for example, a witness's demeanor when the witness uses it
State Employees' Retirement Bd., 731 A.2d 640, 647 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (reiterating the Supreme
Court's holding in Hammer); sources cited supra note 106.
111. See IAN H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 488 (1999) (arguing that the corroboration require-
ment "no longer has a plausible justification and could be scrapped without loss"); PAUL ROBERTS &
ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 470 (2004) (writing that "even if section 13 of the 1911 Act
might originally have been justified as a bulwark against witness intimidation or manipulation, this
rationalization no longer validates the continuing demand for corroboration").
112. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609 ("The rule may originally have stemmed from quite different
reasoning, but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has been the fear that innocent witnesses
might be unduly harassed or convicted in perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were adopted.");
ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 111, at 470. Roberts and Zuckerman, however, favor other methods
of reducing this chilling effect. Conditioning prosecutions for perjury upon the approval of a high-
ranking prosecutorial official (in England, the Director of Public Prosecutions) is one such method. Id.
113. Under Section 1 of the Perjury Act of 1911, "If any person lawfully sworn as a witness ... in a
judicial proceeding willfully makes a statement material in that proceeding which he knows to be false
or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof on
indictment, be liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven years, or to imprisonment... for
a term not exceeding two years, or to a fine or to both such penal servitude or imprisonment and fine."
Perjury Act, 1911, c.6, § 1 (Eng.).
The federal definition of perjury in the United States is similarly broad. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1621
(2000):
Whoever -
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which
a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or
certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury ...
willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true ...
is guilty of perjury.
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deliberately as a form of communication? Second, what does it mean for
testimony to be "false"? Would this description attach to untruthful testimony
when the witness indirectly but still deliberately signals to the court that his
testimony is not to be believed (along the lines of the famous "Liar Para-
dox"' 14)? Would reticent non-acknowledgment of the truth qualify as perjurious
deceit?" '5 Third, how (if at all) should these questions affect our view of the
defendant's mens rea?
These ambiguities in the definition of perjury are important because many
witnesses testifying in court would rather not be there." 6 Participating in
litigation, even as a mere witness, costs time and money and often causes
considerable stress through the public examination of vague, unsavory, or
personal events, circumstances, or relationships. Witnesses facing these disincen-
tives have much to lose and little to gain from telling the truth. Many of them
nonetheless choose to testify because they fear punishment for contempt (and in
some cases, moral reprobation as well).1 7 A witness in this category often will
deliver evasive testimony that obfuscates the truth without making any affirma-
tive attempts to mislead the court. Indeed, his testimony might so openly
display reticence that it does not induce the court to make any incorrect factual
finding. The testimony says, in effect, "I am forced to testify against my will,
and am very uncomfortable doing so, so please don't place too much weight on
what I'm saying." Is this testimony perjury?
A longstanding approach to these issues has been to interpret the definition of
perjury broadly by resolving any ambiguities in the prosecution's favor. Thus,
any part of a witness's material testimony amounts to perjury if it is untrue;
falsity cannot be offset by the witness's apparent reticence or evasiveness or by
any other credible signal that induces the court not to believe the witness." 8
114. See R.M. SAINSSRY, PARADOXES 111-17 (2d ed. 1995) (describing and analyzing the "Liar
Paradox," exemplified by semantically defective statements such as, "What I am now saying is false.").
115. Thomas Nagel argues that it would not because it flows from generally known conventions. See
Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 3 (1998); see generally BERNARD
A. 0. WILLIAMS, TRuTH & TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 96-100 (2002) (acknowledging the
validity of the distinction between lying and being reticent or even misleading).
116. See, e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973) (discussing reasons behind the
reluctance of witnesses to testify); Lisa C. Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L. REv.
1755, 1802 (1996) (calling for legislation that will encourage testimony from reluctant witnesses in
order to counterbalance the chilling effect of increased perjury prosecutions).
117. See, e.g., Richard H. Underwood, Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 715,
754 (1998) (noting that the "contempt trap" argument advanced by witnesses to avoid testifying has
generally not been successful).
118. See, e.g., Holbrooks v. Commonwealth, 85 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2002) (holding that "material-
ity specifically includes all false statements which could have affected the outcome of the proceeding,
regardless of the actual effect or admissibility of the statement") (emphasis in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Hawkins, 620 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 2000) (stating that testimony
is "material" when "it directly or circumstantially... supports or attacks the credibility of a witness, or
... has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove some relevant fact irrespective of the main fact at
issue, or ... is capable of influencing the court, officer, tribunal or other body created by law on any
proper matter of inquiry"); United States v. Giarrantano, 622 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing
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Likewise, the witness need not harbor an intent to mislead the court or even
perceive any risk that his false statement might do so; mere awareness of the
statement's untruthfulness satisfies the mens rea requirement." 9 In short, wit-
nesses must always tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,"
and any deliberate violation of this duty qualifies as perjury. 120 The reason for
this approach is simple. Broadly defining perjury in this way strengthens the
incentives of all witnesses to testify truthfully and eases the prosecution's
burden in cases in which witnesses have in fact lied.
12 1
But it also creates a problem. The definition of perjury becomes overbroad in
that it condemns and punishes individuals who do not necessarily produce the
harm at which the prohibition against perjury aims. That harm is an erroneous
verdict that false testimony actively induces.122 Openly evasive testimony does
not do this because everyone can see that the witness is passively refusing to
assist the court in its pursuit of the truth. At its worst, such testimony amounts to
that "[t]he test for materiality is a broad one," specifically, "whether the false testimony was capable of
influencing the tribunal on the issue before it," and that false testimony "need not be material to any
particular issue but may be material to any proper matter of inquiry"); Alan Heinrich, Note, Clinton's
Little White Lies: The Materiality Requirement for Perjury in Civil Discovery, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1303, 1311-16 (1999) (demonstrating that courts uniformly interpret the "materiality" requirement for
perjury in very broad terms).
119. See United States v. Williams, 874 E2d 968, 980 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that for perjury
purposes, absence of a motive to deceive the court does not exonerate a witness who knowingly gives
false testimony on one of the material issues); United States v. Lewis, 876 F. Supp. 308, 312 (D. Mass.
1994) ("[P]erjury does not require proof that the defendant had the specific intent to impede justice.");
CAL. PENAL CODE § 123 (West 1999) ("It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the accused did
not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the
proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient that it was material, and might have been used to
affect such proceeding."); cf 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000) (in order to convict a defendant of making
false statements to a grand jury or court, the prosecution only has to show knowledge by the defendant
that the statement was false).
A few states reject this broad interpretation. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.02(a) (Vernon 2003) (a
person commits perjury "if, with intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning...
he makes a false statement under oath"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 575.040 (West 1995) ("A person commits
the crime of perjury if, with the purpose to deceive, he knowingly testifies falsely to any material fact
upon oath or affirmation legally administered, in any official proceeding before any court, public body,
notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-702 (2004)
(any "person... who, with intent to deceive ... makes a false statement, under oath" commits perjury).
120. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 (1962) ("A person is guilty of perjury.., if in any official
proceeding he makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation ... when the statement is
material and he does not believe it to be true."); Jared S. Hosid, Perjury, 39 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 895
(2002) (analyzing the definition of perjury).
121. See generally Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, Truth-Bonding and other Truth-Revealing
Mechanisms for Courts, 17 EuR. J.L. & ECON. 307 (2004).
122. See, e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973) (holding that literally true
statements made under oath that are evasive or unresponsive must be resolved through further
questioning by counsel, not by prosecution for perjury, and that such statements do not fall within the
federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000)); see also United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1299
(11th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he prosecutor's purpose must be to obtain the truth. Perjury, of course, thwarts
that proper purpose. It must not be the prosecutor's purpose, however, to obtain perjury, thus avoiding
more precise questions which might rectify the apparent perjury.").
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contempt of court' 23 -conduct that is certainly reprehensible, but not as perni-
cious as perjury. As many commentators have noted, evasive as opposed to
affirmatively misleading testimony raises normatively difficult questions about
the extent to which an individual's moral entitlement to privacy and nonexpo-
sure should limit her truthtelling obligations to society. 124 From a moral (as
opposed to formal legal) point of view, it is one thing to actively bring about an
injustice, and it is quite another thing to withdraw one's testimonial assistance
from a justice-making proceeding. From the moral perspective, only outright
liars who actively mislead the court can properly be identified and condemned
as perjurers. 121
So why not re-interpret the perjury prohibition more narrowly to reflect these
nuances? The answer parallels the answer to the similar definitional problem we
faced with the safe versus unsafe drivers: operational constraints prevent it.
Because the line between lying and evading is often hard to discern, narrowing
the prohibition to capture only outright liars but not evaders would substantially
increase the difficulty of successful perjury prosecutions.' 26 It also would
substantially decrease the incentives that a witness has not to lie. The substan-
tive law's resolution of this difficulty is to err on the side of casting a wide net
by leaving the broader definition of perjury in place. In doing so, the law
produces overenforcement of the definitional spillover variety by pooling non-
liars with liars and imposing its sanction on both.
The common law corroboration requirement counteracts this effect by leaven-
ing the overbroad definition of perjury with a special evidentiary rule through
which many evasive-but still not affirmatively misleading-witnesses escape
criminal liability. The net effect of this mechanism is to require the prosecution
to identify a particular falsity in the defendant's testimony, to demonstrate its
materiality, to show that the defendant knew about the falsity when he testified,
and to provide additional and independent proof on each of these points to back
up a witness who testifies about the falsity. Such particularized proof typically
exists only in cases involving outright liars as opposed to merely evasive
witnesses. In general, therefore, a prosecutor will have a much harder time
bringing a successful perjury case against the latter sort of witness than she will
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (2000) ("Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to
any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order
of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, paper, document, record,
recording or other material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its
attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is
willing to give such testimony or provide such information.").
124. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 96-100.
125. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the
Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASnNGS L.J. 157, 179-80 (2001) (distinguishing on
moral grounds between lying and misleading and defending the "literal falsity" approach to perjury); id.
at 172-73 (arguing that defensive deception is excusable on self-preservation grounds).
126. See Holbrooks v. Commonwealth, 85 S.W.3d 563, 569-70 (Ky. 2002) (observing that a broadly
defined perjury prohibition is necessary for "a practical and workable statutory scheme which is not
overly restrictive to prosecution").
[Vol. 93:17431770
2005] OVERENFORCEMENT 1771
against the former. 127 While an evasive witness still runs the risk of being
identified as a perjurer under the overbroad definition of the crime, he at least
faces a decreased risk of being prosecuted and convicted. This tradeoff substan-
tially reduces the chilling effect that the overbroad definition of perjury exerts
upon prospective witnesses. It does so, moreover, while partially sorting perjury
suspects into evasive witnesses and outright liars by encouraging prosecutors to
tend toward charging the latter more than the former. The tradeoff admittedly
remains imperfect, but it is better than the alternative. 1
28
III. OVERENFORCEMENT AND CORPORATE CRIME
The doctrine of corporate criminal liability creates unique problems of overen-
forcement. Those problems come in two forms. The first is a straightforward
market spillover. Investigations and convictions of corporations, like those of
individuals, often trigger significant extralegal sanctions for the defendants and
their employees. These sanctions include loss of morale,' 29 damage to reputa-
tion and corporate image,' 30 damage to relationships with customers, suppliers,
127. Some scholars claim that the prosecution's burden is too heavy, to the detriment of society. See,
e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 68 (3d ed. 1963) (noting the difficulty of proving the
guilty mind as affecting all prosecutions for perjury); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real
Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1488-89 (1997) (book review) ("Oaths are taken less seriously
today .... [F]ewer people believe in hell, and an oath is no longer thought to be effective because of
extratemporal consequences for false swearing. The only real bite behind an oath is the specter of a
perjury prosecution, and perjury is notoriously difficult to prove.... Indeed, the ethos of today is that
perjury is commonplace .... "); Harris, supra note 116, at 1774-75 (explaining that proving perjury is
difficult because "there is often no physical evidence and the prosecutor must not only prove that the
statement was false, but [also] that the witness believed that the statement was false" and "that the false
statement was material to the case").
128. For another similar example, consider Article III, Section 3(1) of the United States Constitu-
tion, which provides, "No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in Open Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. This
constitutional corroboration requirement counterbalances a definition of treason in the same provision
that is both overbroad and ambiguous: "Treason against the United States shall consist ... [inter alia] in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000)
("Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer
death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000;
and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.").
129. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS
35 (1983) (describing impact of accusations and findings of corporate wrongdoing on employee
morale); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their
Employees and Agents, 41 Lov. L. REV. 279, 321-22 (1995) (describing the "stigma and public
opprobrium and the concomitant fall in employee morale which often result in defections of talent
[that] can hobble the corporation well after the financial loss from a fine has been recouped").
130. See, e.g., Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited
Liability Entities-Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 73 (observing that the consequences of investigation and prosecution can be "particularly severe
for business entities that rely upon their reputation to survive: even if they ultimately prevail on the
merits at trial, it is usually too late and the business is ruined"); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative
Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 969 (1999) (noting how the first prosecu-
tions of business leaders under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
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and the government,' 3' bars to future business, 132 and (as a consequence of all
of this) significant drops in share price and market share. 133 The size of these
extralegal penalties often dwarfs that of the formal legal penalties. In an
empirical study involving corporate criminal fraud, for example, Jonathan
Karpoff and John Lott concluded that "the reputational cost of corporate fraud
is large and constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms accused or convicted
of fraud."' 134 Decreasing firms' legal sanctions by the sum of these costs,
however, would be both practically infeasible and expressively unjustifiable, for
it likely would require reduction of the legal sanction to near zero. 135
The second type of overenforcement that occurs in the corporate crime
context is more complicated and follows from the incentives created by the
substantive law of corporate criminal liability. The scope of corporate criminal
liability under American law is very broad. Corporations "may be criminally
liable for almost any crime except acts manifestly requiring commission by
natural persons, such as rape and murder." 136 The standards that courts use to
triggered a significant "reputational rub-off effect"); cf David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1831-32 (2001) (noting the reputational damage to Texaco and Denny's in the
wake of their respective racial discrimination suits).
131. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 504 (concluding that legal sanctions for fraud may lead to
"termination and/or suspension of business relationships with customers as a significant form of
real-world reputational sanction").
132. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 354(a) (2000) (barring corporations convicted of violating the Service
Contracts Labor Standards Act from receiving new contract awards for three years); 42 U.S.C. §
7606(a) (2000) (prohibiting federal agencies from entering into any contracts with companies convicted
of violating the Clean Air Act until Administrator's certification that the condition has been corrected);
Brown, supra note 129, at 321-22 (listing collateral consequences of indictment and conviction for
corporations as including disqualification from doing business in regulated areas and loss of contracts
with government).
133. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 505-06 (reviewing data suggesting that the average decline in
stock price for companies publicly charged with corporate wrongdoing was four times greater than
legal penalties ultimately imposed by the court); see also Karpoff & Lott, supra note 24, at 773
(concluding that publication of stories in the Wall Street Journal of "alleged or actual fraud correspond
with statistically significant and economically meaningful losses in equity value"); cf Steven A.
Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 109 (2000) (describing how
investor reaction to news of tape recordings and other evidence of discrimination contributed to a loss
of more than one billion dollars in Texaco's market capitalization).
134. Karpoff & Lott, supra note 24, at 758. Specifically, Karpoff and Lott found that under the
sentencing scheme in effect at the time, only 6.5 percent of the share value lost by firms that were
investigated for or convicted of fraud was attributable to court-imposed costs, with penalties and
criminal fines accounting for only 1.4 percent. Id. at 759. The remainder of the loss-93.5 percent-
was attributable to lost reputation. Id. at 796.
135. See supra section I.A. Indeed, as Karpoff and Lott themselves noted, despite the substantial
extralegal sanctions associated with conviction, at the time of their article, the expected penalty for
conviction of fraud "seemed surprisingly low." Karpoff & Lott, supra note 24, at 758. Amendments to
the organizational sentencing guidelines have now raised the potential fine substantially, but the
disparity between the legal penalty and the extralegal sanction is still very large, and the same
constraints remain. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 492-93.
136. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1477, 1488 (1996). But see People v. O'Neill, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (implying that a
corporation may be convicted even of murder).
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attribute liability to corporations also are easily satisfied. 13 7 Corporate liability
is vicarious and, from the firm's standpoint, strict. A firm can be criminally
liable for any crimes committed by its employees while acting within the scope
of their employment and to benefit the firm.' 38 The "firm's benefit" qualifier is
much less restrictive than it sounds. So long as the employee was carrying out a
job-related activity, the firm can be liable, even if it expressly prohibited the
wrongdoing and implemented procedures to prevent it. 139
The basic idea behind this doctrine is that vicarious liability for corporations
reduces wrongdoing on the part of their agents by fostering optimal deterrence
of those agents. Vicarious liability, the thinking goes, does this by inducing
firms to control their employees in a number of ways.' 40 It causes firms to
implement preventive measures, such as compliance programs and similar
measures which decrease the risk of crime ex ante.' 4 ' It encourages firms to
undertake policing measures, or measures that increase the probability that
employees who do break the law are apprehended and sanctioned.1 42 And, when
employees are apprehended, it reduces sanctioning costs by encouraging the
firm itself, rather than the government, to penalize the employees in cases in
which the firm is in a better position than the government to do So. 14 3 The
ultimate effect of all these measures-compliance programs, self-policing, and
swift internal sanctioning-is to increase the expected liability for individual
wrongdoers. By deterring misconduct on the part of the firm's individual
employees, the measures reduce the firm's likelihood of being held criminally
liable.
There is, however, a downside. On the ground, this scheme can lead to
substantial overenforcement for firms attempting to comply in good faith.
Assuming that the legal sanctions for corporate criminal liability are set high
enough so that firms want to avoid them, firms will implement some or all of
the measures just discussed in an attempt to decrease their liability. But despite
their best efforts, firms can never stamp out all misconduct. Some residual
offenses will occur. In those cases, the same measures that firms employ to
attempt to decrease their own liability will backfire. By increasing the probabil-
ity that the government will detect and sanction any residual offenses, the firm
137. See Khanna, supra note 136, at 1488-89.
138. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-95 (1909);
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1247-49 (1979) [hereinafter Developmentsl.
139. See Developments, supra note 138, at 1249-50 (discussing how courts broadly interpret the
"scope of employment" prong to include any job-related activity, including prohibited as opposed to
merely unauthorized employee conduct).
140. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324-25,
333-49 (1996) (offering an economic rationale for this doctrine, limited by the condition that corpora-
tions should pay no more than the social costs of the crimes perpetrated by their agents).
141. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.YU. L. REV. 687, 701-05 (1997).
142. See id. at 706-12.
143. See id. at 700-01.
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will actually increase its own expected liability. 144
This "liability enhancement effect," as Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman
call it, 145 is a variant of definitional spillover which results from the failure of
the substantive liability standard-strict vicarious liability-to distinguish be-
tween firms that self-police and self-monitor and firms that do not. Perversely,
the overenforcement flowing from the liability enhancement effect can lead to
underdeterrence of corporate misconduct. If by self-monitoring and self-
policing a firm increases the probability of its own conviction under the
vicarious liability standard, then firms subject to that standard will have a
disincentive to undertake such measures, or at least to undertake them in good
faith past a certain point. 146 Firms facing a disincentive to self-monitor and
self-police may find it harder to credibly threaten their employees with sanc-
tions. The paradoxical result of these effects is underdeterrence. Neither raising
nor lowering the legal sanction can remedy this problem, because both a weaker
and a stronger sanction would produce a disincentive for the firm to root out
misconduct by its employees.
One might attempt to solve this dilemma by tinkering with the substantive
liability rule to eliminate the definitional spillover. For example, the law could
specify the preventive and policing measures that the firm needs to take, both
before and after the crime, to avoid or at least mitigate its criminal liability.
Arlen and Kraakman and others have advocated this approach, a variant of
which is now embodied in the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. 147
This solution is a good start for mitigating the problem of the definitional
spillover. But it is far from complete. It leaves the market spillover without a
remedy. It also creates counterproductive incentives for firms to comply only
"cosmetically" with their prevention and policing duties, in order to reap the
benefits of a duty-based regime (avoidance or mitigation) without incurring the
costs (discovery and consequent investigation of misconduct and possible convic-
tion). 148
144. See id. at 708. See generally Jeffrey W. Nunes, Comment, Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines: The Conundrum of Compliance Programs and Self-Reporting, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1039 (1995).
145. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 141, at 707-09 (observing that in a strict liability regime, a
firm's self-policing measures increase its expected liability when either the firm reports detected
wrongdoing to the government or the government suspects the wrongdoing independently).
146. See sources cited infra note 148 (discussing "cosmetic compliance").
147. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 141, at 718-38 (advocating mixed or composite liability
standards in place of purely strict or duty-based liability); see also V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability
Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239,
1268-69 (2000) (describing composite liability approaches); 18 U.S.C. app. § 8B2.1 (2004) (mitigating
sentences for convicted companies that, among other things, have bona fide compliance programs in
place).
148. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003) ("[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance
structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing
function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability."); William S. Laufer,
Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1408 (1999)
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Within our framework, one way to supplement this approach is to introduce
evidentiary and procedural barriers that encourage the corporation to self-police
while reducing its probability of being found guilty of a crime. A broad
attorney-client privilege is one such barrier. This privilege would allow a
corporation to investigate potential crimes within the firm confidentially by
entrusting the investigation to its attorney. The privilege should attach whenever
the attorney is fulfilling this role, whether the attorney communicates with
corporate officers or low-level employees. This in fact corresponds to the form
of corporate attorney-client privilege that the Supreme Court upheld in Upjohn
Co. v. United States. 149 In this form, the privilege is available only to corpora-
tions.
Even so, a corporation's Upjohn privilege is still very limited. Like the
garden-variety attorney-client privilege, it only protects from disclosure informa-
tion that attorneys and clients exchange between themselves to facilitate the
attorney's legal advice to the client or the client's legal representation by the
attorney. 150 Corporate crime cases are document intensive. The papers involved
often include documents from clients, business partners, and any number of
other sources. To receive protection and consequent exemption from disclosure
under the attorney-client privilege, however, documents must qualify as the
"work product of the lawyer."' 5' The attorney-client privilege thus by no means
exempts from disclosure all potentially incriminating information that a corpora-
tion may uncover in an internal investigation. Moreover, empirical evidence
suggests that even when the privilege would exempt information, corporations
often waive it to avoid adverse inferences and other repercussions. 1
52
In these circumstances, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination is another evidentiary barrier that calls for consideration. 153 As
the law stands now, this privilege protects only natural persons and not corpora-
tions. 54 Nor does it extend to a corporate agent or employee who is required by
(arguing that many firm compliance programs are ineffective and "are often adopted for the appearance
of legitimacy and legal protection").
149. 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
150. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 322-30.
151. Id. at 353-60.
152. See Interview with United States Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Department of Justice's
Policy on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client Privi-
lege and Work Product Protection, in CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 2004, at 381, 384
(PLI Order No. 3220, 2004) ("[M]any corporations choose to go f[u]rther in order to demonstrate their
commitment to cooperation by voluntarily waiving privileges and forging a much closer relationship
with Government investigators in order to uncover wrongdoing.").
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 120 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[L]abor
unions, corporations, partnerships and other collective entities have no Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination privilege."); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (holding that the self-
incrimination privilege only protects natural persons and does not extend to organizations); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) (holding that the self-incrimination privilege does not protect
corporations in light of the social need to obtain inside corporate information in order to effectively
police corporate abuses).
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law to provide to the government documents or other information tending to
incriminate the corporation. 155 In addition, although an agent or employee can
still claim the privilege in her personal capacity, her right to do so is limited by
the "collective entity" rule. 15 6 Under that rule, a person's assumption of a
corporate job entails a duty to produce corporate documents regardless of the
self-incriminating consequences. 157 A corporate agent or employee holding
corporate documents in her representative capacity therefore "has no right to
resist a demand for production of those documents ... on the basis of his [or
her] Fifth Amendment privilege." 158 The reason for this limitation is straightfor-
ward. Allowing an agent or employee to exercise her privilege in such circum-
stances would circumvent the inapplicability of the privilege to corporations
and other organizations. 15 9 This, in turn, would disarm police and prosecutors in
their fight against corporate crime. 160
These limitations on the privilege against self-incrimination in the corporate
context are not without merit. Yet, to ameliorate the overenforcement problem,
the law might consider providing corporations at least some protection against
compulsory self-incrimination. The best way of doing so would be to grant
corporations a removable privilege against self-incrimination. Corporations would
have the privilege, but police and prosecutors would be able to obtain judicial
warrants for its removal. Judges would issue such warrants upon a showing of
probable cause. To show probable cause, prosecutors would need to produce
their own evidence pointing to the perpetration of a corporate crime. Together
with the attorney-client privilege, this evidentiary barrier would reduce overde-
terrence by reducing the corporation's ex ante probability of conviction and
allowing it to safely self-police (but not to commit misconduct with impu-
nity).16'
We conclude this part of the Article with empirical observation. Unlike the
examples discussed in Part II, in the case of corporate crime, law enforcement
already faces substantial informal barriers and constraints. 162 These constraints
counteract overenforcement on the ground and thereby lessen the practical need
for offsetting evidentiary and procedural mechanisms. This helps explain the
absence of any robust development of privileges for corporations. Practical
155. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-85 (1911); 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 9, at
472-73.
156. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110-15 (1988) (reaffirming the "collective entity"
rule); Wilson, 221 U.S. at 377-85 (establishing the "collective entity" rule).
157. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110.
158. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 473-74.
159. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110.
160. See id. at 115.
161. More narrowly tailored, task-specific privileges might also be constructed. The rise of environ-
mental audit privileges is a good illustration of this. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 141, at 742-44;
Khanna, supra note 147, at 1267-68.
162. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime
Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. Crum. L. 521, 526-27 (2004) (observing that the complexity of corporate
crime and the privacy within which it is committed create barriers to investigation and prosecution).
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The framework established in this Article gives rise to several objections. The
most straightforward of these is that it is needlessly complicated. A much
simpler way to ameliorate any deterrence problems from overenforcement is to
reduce the level of detection and prosecution for potential transgressors.1 64
Doing so would reduce their ex ante probability of suffering excessive harm,
but it would do so without introducing the drafting and application costs that
procedural and evidentiary mechanisms carry with them.
This solution is available only in a small category of cases, if at all.
Underdetection (which we mean to include under-prosecution as well) is not an
option in civil litigation between private parties, such as class actions, where the
power to file lawsuits is vested in individuals outside the government. A private
plaintiff's overarching criterion for filing a lawsuit is the difference between the
expected investment in and the expected return from the litigation. She is not
concerned about overenforcement and whether refraining from suit would help
counteract its effects.1
65
In criminal cases, and in civil cases brought by the government, underdetec-
tion is theoretically available but still problematic. Underdetection might be a
viable solution for the subset of activities that, while nominally criminal or
subject to civil penalties, are not widely considered objectionable-say, jaywalk-
ing in New York City (as opposed to Los Angeles) or "deviant" sex between
consenting adults in private. Of course, this approach still would require costly
163. See id. at 529-30 (describing strategies adopted by the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches to counter the inherent privacy advantages enjoyed by corporations); V. S. Khanna, Corporate
Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis 24 (Sept. 23, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm)
(noting that the increased resources that corporations may put into defending suits can have "effects
that are analogous to a higher standard of proof'). It was in fact these types of practical limitations that
prompted the Supreme Court to refuse to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege to corporations and
their officers (whenever they act in their official capacities) in the first place. See supra note 154.
164. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 635 (arguing that discretionary nonenforcement may temper
the costs of overbroad laws); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 38-41 (1975) (same).
165. As Steven Shavell points out, there is a fundamental divergence between the privately and the
socially desirable level of suit. See SHAVELL, supra note 66, at 391-97. One might try to get around this
problem by increasing the fees required for initiating suit. Cf. Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(2000) (authorizing court to require plaintiff to post a bond for attorney's fees and other costs in order
to guard against nuisance suits); Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2000) (authorizing a similar
bond requirement for similar reasons). To have any appreciable mitigation effect on overenforcement,
these fees would need to be very large, so large that they might in fact lead to underenforcement or
might undesirably skew the distribution of lawsuits among potential plaintiffs, rich and poor. Financing
of lawsuits (by attorneys working on a contingent-fee basis, or otherwise) could rectify this shortcom-
ing. But to the extent this prospect is real, it undercuts the very purpose of the filing-fee mechanism:
reduction of the number of lawsuits filed.
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measures to ensure the proper level of underdetection and to protect against
abusive law enforcement.'1 66 But for activities that are both criminal and viewed
as such-for example, corporate fraud--deliberate underdetection is not viable.
The expressive considerations that constrain the dilution of penalties in such
cases also limit deliberate underdetection and under-prosecution in the first
instance. '
67
This answer leads to a second objection. The procedural and evidentiary
mechanisms of the overenforcement paradigm result in zero enforcement for
some defendants who otherwise would have been found liable and sanctioned
under the controlling substantive rule. Arguably, in cases in which this occurs, it
erodes the expressive function of the law in the same way (and just as much) as
would offsetting penalties or refusing to prosecute at the outset.
Evidentiary and procedural barriers might well trigger some expressive fall-
out if the public were to view them as mere "'technicalities' that require courts
to let admittedly guilty defendants go free." 168 The exclusionary rule is often
cited as one example.1 69 The rules most fitting to our paradigm, however,
largely avoid this problem. For instance, a qualified privilege of the sort we
propose for corporations, removable upon a showing of probable cause, likely
would not raise such concerns because it would not apply to corporate crimes
for which the government had its own independent evidence of guilt.' 70 The
same holds true for other mechanisms that reduce overenforcement while
effectively sorting between right and wrong liability decisions.
In addition, even in cases in which the public does view such mechanisms as
166. See, e.g., United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that police
impermissibly issued jaywalking citation in order to detain defendant so that they could perform a
warrant check and a search); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1151-53 (Cal. 1995) (discussing
city's selective use of jaywalking citations against homeless residents); supra notes 50-52 and
accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text. Even in the residual category of cases for which
underdetection might be available, it is not at all clear how it could work in practice. To counteract the
overdeterrence that overenforcement creates, prosecutors would need to credibly pre-commit to underde-
tection. Randomized and binding underdetection, however, is hardly feasible. Binding underdetection
guidelines that instruct prosecutors how and what to detect and prosecute would be more feasible. Cf.
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components,
Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate-guidelines.htm (establishing criteria to guide the investigation and prosecution of business
entities). But such guidelines would then be an instance of a procedural mechanism that falls within our
paradigm.
168. Kahan, supra note 4, at 390 (footnote omitted).
169. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an Exclusion-
ary Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107, 1124-25 (2000) ("[T]he
instances of Fourth Amendment violations that seem less than willful to the layperson are the likely
origin of the common public perception that the exclusionary rule is a technicality, rather than the
important and substantive constitutional remedy that it reflects."); Kahan, supra note 4, at 390
(describing the "expressive effect" of the exclusionary rule); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,
Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 75, 77-78 (1992) (describing the unpopularity of the exclusionary rule with the general public).
170. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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mere technicalities, their expressive costs would be less than those of the
alternatives. As a general matter, laypersons are likely to perceive a failure to
convict or an inability to prosecute in the face of an evidentiary or procedural
obstacle as expressively less objectionable than an affirmative decision to
forego punishing a criminal whose guilt has already been determined under
applicable substantive standards and procedural rules. This is true even when
the ultimate end of both the procedural barrier and the setoff or declination
decision is to serve broader social welfare goals. The expressive consequences
of rules and decisions are matters of social meaning which do not turn solely on
the purposes of the rules or the decisionmaker's intent.
71 Means matter.1 72
Facially neutral procedural and evidentiary rules that make liability more
difficult to prove minimize the appearance of overt tradeoffs between instrumen-
tal (optimal deterrence) and non-instrumental (moral condemnation) concerns in
a way that outright setoff or declination decisions for clearly liable defendants
do not. 173 And it is these overt tradeoffs that the public is most likely to see as
morally and expressively offensive. 174 That may well be why, for example,
juries deliver higher punitive awards against corporations that explicitly use
cost-benefit analysis in their product safety decisions than against those that do
not. 175
A final objection has to do with what we earlier described as the unsure
171. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1513-14 (2000) (describing the limited role of legislative intent
in the public's ascription of meaning to legislative acts).
172. See id. at 1506-14 (arguing that expressive norms are concerned with both the consequences of
actions and the means of achieving those consequences).
173. This is because the former pit against each other values that are generally perceived as
commensurable, while the latter do not. See Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-offs:
Reactions to Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 256 (1997)
(arguing that "values are constitutively incommensurable whenever people believe that entering one
value into a trade-off calculus with the other subverts or undermines that value," and that people reject
such comparisons "because they feel that seriously considering the relevant trade-offs would undercut
their self-images and social identities as moral beings"); see also id. at 288 (stating that "[tihe most
viable defense" to public censure for certain types of value tradeoffs "is to minimize public awareness
of [them] by maximizing the opacity of the decision-making process"); Douglas A. Kysar, The
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1738 (2003) (arguing that "nominal adherence
to the proposition that life has infinite value," although clearly not true, "serves important social
purposes that advocates of risk-utility analysis ignore," particularly where lay perceptions are in-
volved).
174. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning:
Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1135-36 (2003) (arguing that comparing
or exchanging money with a "'sacred value"' such as justice will "strike most people as distasteful and
morally offensive") (citations omitted); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable:
Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 853, 856 (2000) (concluding based on experimental evidence that "the longer observers
believe a decision maker considered a taboo trade-off, the more punitively they will judge that decision
maker"). See generally Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 173 (articulating a general theory of "taboo
trade-offs").
175. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 552-59
(2000) (showing through a survey of 489 mock jurors that jurors are more likely to award punitive
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relationship between extralegal sanctions and legal penalties.' 76 Theoretically,
social sanctions may function as efficient supplements to legal penalties. When
they do, social sanctions create no overdeterrence because legal penalties
underdeter. Our framework therefore should not apply. Using procedural and
evidentiary mechanisms to decrease the expected legal sanction in such cases
would create underdeterrence. How, one might object, are lawmakers and
adjudicators to know when social sanctions function as efficient supplements to
legal penalties, as opposed to when they create overenforcement?
At bottom, this objection is an empirical one that requires further investiga-
tion into the precise relationship between social and legal sanctions on a
case-by-case (or category-by-category) basis. That task is well beyond the scope
of this Article. But as things stand now, no readily identifiable means exist by
which social sanctions coordinate with legal sanctions to achieve efficient
outcomes. To the contrary, although application of one sanction may affect the
other, efficient complementarity between the two appears implausible. 177 Law-
makers and adjudicators therefore cannot-and, empirically, do not-generally




Ever since Bentham, the traditional wisdom has maintained that all proce-
dural and evidentiary rules are geared to a single objective. 179 Operating in a
legal system that has to live with the ever-present possibility of error and
damages and to give marginally larger punitive damage awards against corporations that use explicit
cost-benefit or risk analysis than against those that do not).
176. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; see also Khanna, supra note 163, at 22-23
(observing that it is difficult to predict the likely magnitude of a reputational sanction for a corporate
defendant).
177. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 172 (2000) (rejecting "the view that social
practices and norms are efficient or adaptive in some way" as "empirically false and methodologically
sterile"); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and
Internalization, 79 O. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (2000) (discussing the uncertain relationship of social sanctions
to legal punishments); Cooter & Porat, supra note 5 (assuming, without addressing, the implausibility
of the coordination scenario). See generally Teichman, supra note 28, at 2 (discussing relationship of
legal to nonlegal sanctions).
178. See Teichman, supra note 28, at 2-3 (arguing that, when determining punishment for sex
offenders, policymakers by and large have failed to take into account the harsh nonlegal sanctions
triggered by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws that exist in every state). To the
extent that courts take such penalties into account in meting out sentences, they tend to do so in an
ad-hoc manner. See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Am. Exp. Limousine Serv. Ltd., 785 F. Supp. 334, 338
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (reversing earlier order awarding damages for trademark infringement on ground that
"defendants have suffered enough [through litigation and other costs] to deter future infringement");
State v. Ring, 56 S.W.3d 577, 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (affirming non-incarcerative sentence in
light of, among other things, defendant's remorse and depression and noting that "[t]here is no
mathematical equation to be utilized in determining sentencing alternatives").
179. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 344-47 (1986) (explaining
Bentham's utilitarian system of procedure as based upon provisions "for minimizing evil in each
individual case," with "evil" representing the cost of decisional error and the cost of avoiding it).
1780 [Vol. 93:1743
OVERENFORCEMENT
misuse, these rules skew the risk of error in the right direction to effectuate the
desirable tradeoff between false positives and false negatives and, correspond-
ingly, between correct and erroneous liability decisions.18° Corroboration require-
ments, standards of proof, and pleadings are common examples of these
mechanisms.
Our theory introduces a new dimension to this analysis of evidence and
procedure. By isolating the phenomenon of overenforcement, we demonstrate
how expressive and operational considerations make it unavoidable. In doing
so, we highlight how those considerations prevent overdeterrence from being
remedied through the adjustment of penalties or substantive liability standards.
Where that happens, evidentiary and procedural mechanisms serve an additional
goal. They mitigate the overdeterrence that both erroneous and correct liability
decisions create on the ground. Descriptively, our paradigm helps to better
explain certain features of the evidentiary and procedural landscape in cases
involving definitional and market spillovers. Prescriptively, it provides a new
analytical framework for generating balanced incentives while respecting other
important values and objectives. The specifics of this framework still need to be
fleshed out. Its introduction in this Article is a necessary first step in that
direction.
180. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 599 (stating that the objective of a procedural system, viewed
economically, is to minimize the sum of two types of cost: the cost of erroneous judicial decisions and
the cost of operating the procedural system that reduces the incidence of errors); SHAVELL, supra note
66, at 387-418 (identifying procedural mechanisms that reduce this sum).
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